


















Mankiw (1987) notes that in order to finance its spending, the
government minimizes the loss generated by both tax and
seigniorage revenues. Since both tax and seigniorage revenues
generate inefficiencies at an increasing rate, the government
faces a trade-off between these two sources of revenues. The
optimum financing model suggests that the government raise
both taxes and seigniorage simultaneously. In fact, Mankiw
(1987), Poterba and Rotemberg (1990), and Trehan and Walsh
(1990) all find a positive relationship between inflation and
taxes in the USA during the post-World War II era.
The trade-off between taxation and seigniorage revenue
might be influenced by two factors. These are the divided
government effect on taxation and the effect of the exchange
rate regime on the creation of seigniorage revenue. Regarding
the first factor, Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b), Andrabi
(1992) and Poterba (1994) argue that divided governments are
associated with higher deficits than majority governments.
Changing tax laws often requires consensus among the parties
sharing power in a government. Different parties view taxes
on each group of goods and services differently. If the overall
tax rate needs to be increased, then each party in a divided
government may vote against increasing taxes on a particular
good or service. Hence, divided governments cannot increase
taxes as easily as majority governments. Secondly, Burdekin
(1991) and Cukierman (1992) note that the optimum
seigniorage revenue is affected by the exchange rate regime.
Seigniorage revenue causes inflation and when a country has a
fixed exchange rate regime, inflation results in balance of
payment problems. Therefore, the seigniorage revenue
becomes more costly. Seigniorage revenue creation should
be lower if a country has a fixed exchange rate regime than if
it has a flexible exchange rate regime. The next section
presents the testable model and discusses the empirical
evidence for this model. We then summarize results.
II. THE TESTABLE MODEL AND EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE
It is assumed that a government minimizes the present value of
the losses generated by taxation and seigniorage revenue.1
Since both these revenues generate loss at an increasing rate, a
government likes to raise these two resources together in order
to finance its spending rather than relying on only one of them.
This suggests that there must be a positive relationship
between the tax and the seigniorage revenue. The literature on
the optimum financing model uses inflation as a proxy for
seigniorage revenue (Mankiw, 1987; Poterba and Rotemberg,
1990; and Trehan and Walsh, 1990). However, the inflation
rate is affected by various factors other than seigniorage
revenue. Furthermore, governments can generate seignio-
rage revenue even if there is no inflation (see, for example,
Klein and Neumann, 1990). Berument (1994) sets up a model
where seigniorage revenue is proxied by the monetary base
growth. Therefore, this paper tests the implication of the
hypothesis where the seigniorage revenue is proxied by
monetary base growth as well as inflation rates, both of which
must be positively correlated with the logarithm of tax rates.
We also incorporate the feedback effect from taxation to
income and from monetary base growth from (which
influences the opportunity cost of holding) money to real
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This paper finds that when the Congress and Presidency are controlled by the different
political parties in the USA the creation of the seigniorage revenue to finance spending is
not higher than when those two branches are controlled by the same party. However, the
hypothesis that the creation of seigniorage revenue was lower during the period when
the country had a fixed exchange rate regime was partially supported.
1 Governments are also concerned with the loss generated by issuing bonds. The government ’s intertemporal budget constraint implies that issuing bonds will only
postpone the financing problem to a future date, and ultimately governments must bear the loss generated by either taxation or seigniorage revenue.
money holdings by including the logarithm of the money-
income ratio.
However, divided governments will have difficulty in
raising revenue by taxation, so the creation of seigniorage
revenue should be higher at a given level of taxation.
Furthermore, creation of seigniorage revenue will be lower
if a country has a fixed exchange rate regime system. Hence,
the following equations will be estimated to test the basic
hypotheses of this paper: there is a positive relationship
between tax and seigniorage revenues, seigniorage revenue
creation is lower when a country has a fixed exchange rate
regime, and the seigniorage revenue increases when a country
has a divided government. Equation 1 uses the monetary base
as a proxy for seigniorage revenue and Equation 2 uses
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the inflation rate, ln t is the logarithm of the tax-GNP ratio,
ln mtyt is the logarithm of the real monetary base-real GNP
ratio, ln mt¡1yt is the logarithm of the lag value of the real
monetary base-real GNP ratio, }t is the dummy variable for
divided governments; the dummy variable has a value of one
if the Congress and Presidency are controlled by different
parties, and a value of zero otherwise and Fixt is the dummy
variable for the fixed exchange rate regime; it has a value of
one prior to 1973, and a value of zero otherwise. All the
estimated coefficients except 2… 02† are expected to be
positive, and 2… 02† to be negative.
The instrumental variable (IV) technique is used to estimate
Equations 1 and 2 for a sample of the US annual data from
1951 to 1991.3 The tax rate is measured as the government’s
tax revenue-GNP ratio. The tax rate may not be an exogenous
variable because the government determines its seigniorage
and tax revenues simultaneously. Moreover, various economic
factors, such as business cycles and the President’s approval
rating, could affect both taxes and the money growth rate.4
Hence, when the ordinary least squares method is used to
estimate the model, the estimated coefficients may be biased.
High-powered money is used as money stock which is
reported in Friedman and Schwartz (1982) and updated from
the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. The Federal Government Receipts
and the Federal Government Spending are obtained from the
Economic Report of the President. The government’s approval
ratio is the President’s approval rating taken from Gallup
surveys; the quarterly means are averaged to obtain the annual
figures. The rest of the variables are obtained from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial
Statistics.
The time trend is included in the regression analysis
before estimating the model since both the money growth rate
and the tax rate may follow a common trend. Therefore, a
simple regression analysis may capture the time trend they
share, rather than the underlying relationship between the
variables.5 The optimum financing model suggests not only is
there a positive relation between the tax rate and money
growth rate (or inflation), but also that the tax rate and
money growth rate need to be a random walk. If a proxy of the
seigniorage revenue is a dependent variable, the logarithm of
the tax rate or the lag value of the dependent variable should
be present on the right hand side of Equations 1 and 2, not
both of these variables should be present on the right hand side
of the equations. Hence, we exclude the lag value of money
growth rate from the regression.
The first column of Table 1 reports the estimation results for
Equation 1 after considering the first degree autocorrelation;
here is the parameter for the first degree autocorrelation and
DW represents the Durbin–Watson statistics. First, the
estimated coefficient for the tax rate is positive and significant
at the 10% level, which supports the hypothesis that the
government faces a trade-off between the two financing
instruments and raises both of them to finance additional
spending. Both the estimated coefficients of the divided
government and the exchange rate dummies have negative
signs. Even if the implication of the divided government
hypothesis is not supported, the estimated coefficient for the
fixed exchange rate dummy has an expected sign. However,
neither of these coefficients is statistically significant.6
The optimum financing literature uses inflation as a
measure of seigniorage revenue. In column 2, we used
inflation as a measure of seigniorage as well, and the
estimated coefficient of the tax rate is positive and significant.
Hence, the empirical evidence for the optimum financing
model is stronger when the inflation rate is the dependent
variable rather than the growth rate of monetary base.
However, the divided government dummy is still negative
and statistically insignificant, so we still do not find an altered
preference for the use of seigniorage revenue for divided
governments. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient for
the fixed exchange dummy is now negative and statistically
significant at the 10% level. This result suggests that, at any
given level of tax revenue, when the USA has a fixed
exchange rate regime the government relies less on seignio-
rage revenue than when it has a flexible exchange rate regime.
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2 The derivation of the testable implications of the model is available from the author upon request.
3 The instruments used are reported in the notes to Table 1.
4 Berument and Keech (1995) find that governments rely more on seigniorage revenue than taxation as their approval rates decrease.
5 Both Mankiw (1987) and Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) include a time trend in their regressions.
6 The level of significance is 5%, unless otherwise mentioned.
The optimum financing models do not attempt to account
fully for how government determines its monetary and fiscal
policies; rather, the model considers seigniorage revenue as
one of several motives that the government uses to determine
its economic policies.7 Another important factor that affects a
government’s fiscal and monetary policies is business cycles.
In order to control for the business cycle effect, we follow
Mankiw (1987) and include the growth rate of the real GNP in
the regression analysis on an ad hoc basis. The results are
reported in columns three and four.8 If we consider the
business cycle effects on an ad hoc basis, the evidence
supporting the exchange rate regime effect is weakened when
the seigniorage revenue is proxied by the inflation rate.
However, the results of the divided government hypothesis are
still robust.
The findings on divided governments for the seigniorage
revenue may still be consistent with the explained behaviour
of deficit suggested by Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b) and
others. Divided governments may have some difficulties
decreasing their spending. According to the optimum finan-
cing model, higher spending requires increasing both tax and
seigniorage revenues. Since seigniorage revenue increases
with spending, this requires that taxes increase less than
government spending; hence, the deficit should be higher for
divided governments. However, this does not require that the
seigniorage-tax revenue ratio change.
III. SUMMARY
The divided government argument suggests that when the
Presidency and Congress are controlled by different parties,
governments are less able to reduce their budget deficits
than when they arc controlled by the same party. We test
the implication of the divided government argument for the
seigniorage-tax revenue trade-off which governments face to
finance spending. Using the annual data from 1951 to 1991,
we could not find any evidence suggesting that the choice
between tax and seigniorage revenue to finance spending is
any different when the Presidency and at least one branch of
Congress are controlled by different parties than when both
branches are controlled by the same party. Therefore, the
divided government argument which has been used to explain
the behaviour of the deficit cannot be used to explain the
seigniorage-tax revenue relationship. However, we found
partial support for the hypothesis that a fixed exchange rate
regime is coupled with less seigniorage revenue. Further
research is needed to determine the mechanism by which a
divided government and its exchange rate regime affect the
government’s economic policies.
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Table 1. Seigniorage-tax relationship for divided governmentsa,b:
1951–1991






Constant 41.187 47.838 41.174 33.010
1.536 2.164 1.514 1.687
time ¡0.045 ¡0.199 ¡0.044 ¡0.376
¡0.216 ¡1.002 ¡0.203 ¡2.065
Fixt ¡0.852 ¡3.289* ¡0.861 ¡1.148
¡0.422 ¡1.724 ¡0.405 ¡0.651
ln t 26.439* 24.541** 26.423* 22.598**
1.861 2.370 1.833 2.585
ln mtyt 4.735 ¡4.696
¡0.665 ¡0.621
ln mt¡1Yt ¡6.188 ¡15.832**
¡0.836 ¡2.192
}t ¡0.847 ¡1.396 ¡0.851 ¡0.269
¡0.761 ¡1.379 ¡0.741 ¡0.283
Growth 0.312 ¡32.476**
0.0179 ¡3.188
0.320* 0.629** 0.320* 0.658**
1.954 3.826 1.923 4.527
R2 0.855 0.902 0.855 0.932
DW 1.601 1.576 1.600 1.901




time = time trend, ln t = logarithm of the tax rate, ln
mt¡1
yt
= logarithm of the real
monetary base-real GNP ratio, and ln mt¡1Yt = logarithm of the lag value of the
real monetary base-real GNP ratio. }t = dummy variable for divided
governments; it has a value of one if the Congress and Presidency are
controlled by different parties, and a value of zero otherwise. Fixt = dummy
variable for the fixed exchange rate regime; it has a value of one prior to 1973,
and a value of zero otherwise. Growth = real GNP growth, = the first degree
autocorrelation coefficient , and DW = Durbin–Watson statistics.
a t¡ratios are reported under the corresponding estimated coefficients.
b Instruments used include a constant, the time trend, a dummy variable for the
periods before 1973, the lagged value of the money growth rate, the lagged
value of the logarithm of tax-GNP ratio, the lagged value of the inflation rate,
the lagged value of GNP growth, the logarithm of the lagged money-income
ratio, dummy variables for the term of the administration, the lagged value of
the term dummies with the President’s approval rating, the lagged values
of the export-GNP ratio, the logarithm of the lagged value of the import-GNP
ratio, the logarithm of the wage earnings-GNP ratio, and the lagged value of
the logarithm of the government spending- GNP ratio.
* indicates 10% level of significance .
** indicates 5% level of significance .
7 For a full discussion of a government ’s possible motives regarding how its economic policies are determined, see Cukierman (1992).
8 We also included additional variables to the regression analysis such as government spending-GNP ratio, balance of payment deficit-GNP ratio and the
President’s approval rate. When we include these variables in the business cycle specifications given in columns three and four, we obtained only statistically
insignificant coefficients for additional variables in each case. To save space these results are not reported here.
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